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Must I  Benefit Myself?
Michael Cholbi
Altruism—the selfless concern for others—dominates most popular conceptions of 
morality. Our moral role models tend to be those with reputations for devotion to 
 others’ well-being (such as Mother Theresa) or for great personal sacrifice to serve 
others (such as Nelson Mandela). On this altruistic picture, benevolence and sympathy 
are the primary moral virtues. A number of philosophers have agreed, arguing that 
altruism is all there is to the moral point of view. Morality, on this picture, is “purely and 
essentially other-regarding.”1
On its face, consequentialism accords well with this altruistic conception of morality. 
A central message of consequentialist moral thinking has been that nearly all moral 
agents are exceedingly partial in their moral outlooks and so cast too narrow a net of 
moral concern; taking altruism seriously entails becoming far more concerned for the 
needs or interests of others, including those of distant strangers, future generations, and 
nonhuman animals, groups often consigned to the periphery of ordinary moral thought. 
This same message—that morality places stringent demands on our altruism—is also 
evident in consequentialist writings on practical ethics, which teach that the affluent 
have moral obligations to donate large portions of their wealth to assist the global poor2; 
that having met their children’s needs, parents ought to prioritize other children’s needs 
above their children’s wants3; and that societies should implement schemes to allocate 
scarce goods such as transplant organs with the aim of saving the greatest number of 
lives overall.4 Consequentialism thus seems to embrace a picture of morality wherein 
concern for others is paramount while concern for oneself is minimal or nonexistent, a 
picture in which morality assigns “no positive value to the well-being or happiness of the 
1 Stephen Finlay, “Too Much Morality?” in Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 142.
2 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972): 229–243.
3 James Rachels, “Morality, Parents, and Children,” in his Can Ethics Provide Answers?: And Other 
Essays in Moral Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 213–234.
4 John Harris, “The Survival Lottery,” Philosophy 50 (1975): 81–87.
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moral agent of the sort it clearly assigns to the well-being or happiness of everyone other 
than the agent.”5
It may therefore be surprising that standard versions of consequentialism seem to 
entail that sometimes individuals not only may, but in fact must, benefit themselves. 
Consider these two examples:
Enrollment: Josephine, a university philosophy student, is searching for a final 
course to complete her schedule for the next term. She sees that there is a single spot 
available in a course offered by her favorite ethics professor. Josephine is about to 
enroll in the course using the university’s online system, but at the last moment, she 
texts her friend Kelly, who finds ethics tolerable but not engaging, to let her know of 
the spot in the ethics course, which Kelly takes. Despite knowing that she would 
benefit more from the ethics course than Kelly would, Josephine ends up enrolling 
in a lackluster course in modal logic.
Evacuation: Igor is a solitary, elderly man with no surviving family and few acquain-
tances. He is frail and undergoing steady cognitive decline. Working or contributing 
to socially valuable activities is therefore not a viable possibility for him. These 
challenges notwithstanding, Igor is able to address his basic physical needs on his 
own and enjoys a good quality of life. He is content to spend his days reading war 
histories and watching sports on television. One afternoon, a fire breaks out in his 
apartment building. Rescue crews quickly arrive and give an immediate evacuation 
order for all of the apartment’s residents. Though he is capable of evacuating the 
building, Igor remains in his apartment, knowing that he could well die from the 
fire. He is killed when he inhales the smoke that soon pervades the building.
From a naïve or pretheoretical moral view, how should these examples be analyzed and 
evaluated? In Enrollment, Josephine acts altruistically inasmuch as she foregoes her slot 
in the ethics course so that Kelly can enroll in it. This seems morally permissible, even 
laudable. In Evacuation, we might find Igor’s decision odd; we would naturally wonder 
why, unless he had been depressed, and so on, he would willingly choose to end a life 
that seems congenial if unambitious. And our moral reaction might differ if ending his 
life caused others to suffer or to grieve. But given his isolation and his inability to con-
tribute much to the happiness of others, his death affected only him, and while questions 
might be raised about whether Igor acted prudently, he does not seem to act wrongfully.
Orthodox forms of consequentialism have difficulty validating such responses 
though. Standard act consequentialism holds that agents are obligated to bring about 
the best outcome, that is, the outcome that realizes the greatest good overall in compari-
son with alternatives. But the agents in Enrollment and Evacuation do not satisfy this 
standard. In the former, Josephine stood to gain more from enrolling in the ethics 
course than Kelly did. By giving Kelly the opportunity to enroll in the ethics course, 
Josephine made Kelly better off, but not by a quantity as great as the quantity of goods 
Josephine would have enjoyed if she had enrolled in the ethics course herself. By the 
5 Michael Slote, “Some Advantages of Virtue Ethics,” Identity, Character, and Morality, edited by 
Owen Flanagan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 441.
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lights of stand ard act consequentialism, Josephine’s altruistic act was wrong: she could 
have, but did not, perform the act resulting in the greatest good overall. Let us call exam-
ples such as Enrollment, in which an agent’s action results in good for others but maxi-
mal good would have resulted from her choosing to direct greater benefits to herself 
instead, nonoffsetting failures to self-benefit.
Evacuation is not an example of a nonoffsetting failure to self-benefit. For Igor’s not 
evacuating does not result in some quantity of goods being enjoyed by others. Rather, 
Igor’s choosing not to evacuate amounts to him failing to benefit himself, but no one else 
benefits thereby either. Evacuation thus represents an instance of pure failure to self-
benefit. Nevertheless, standard act consequentialism condemns Igor’s choice on the 
same general grounds as it condemns Josephine’s: he too failed to bring about the great-
est good in comparison with alternatives. Put differently, when only our own well-being 
is at stake, consequentialism seems to demand that we maximize our well-being, a result 
at odds with the sense that failing to benefit oneself (or to benefit oneself to the utmost) 
may be unwise but is rarely immoral.
These examples illustrate that, despite its theoretical and practical emphasis on 
benefitting others, consequentialism appears susceptible to a compulsory self-benefit 
objection: it requires that individuals direct benefits to themselves when doing so is 
entailed by the consequentialist demand to maximize good overall, despite its being 
intuitively morally permissible, or even praiseworthy, for individuals not to direct those 
benefits to themselves.
The compulsory self-benefit objection has force because it flows directly from fea-
tures of consequentialism that many of its adherents find attractive. What unites conse-
quentialist theories is the conviction that the moral status of actions is a function solely 
of the outcomes of those actions, and in particular, how good or desirable these out-
comes are in comparison to one another. The compulsory self-benefit objection gets its 
traction in part from this conviction, since failures to benefit oneself seem to result in 
outcomes that are worse overall. Likewise, consequentialists generally point with pride 
at its incorporating a strong notion of impartiality, wherein the concerns, interests, well-
being, and so on of all affected by an action are taken into account equally when deter-
mining how good that action’s outcome is.6 Josephine and Igor are seemingly required 
to benefit themselves because doing so assigns their own concerns, interests, well-being, 
and so on equal weight to that of others. The theoretical interest of the compulsory 
self-benefit objection therefore resides in the fact that it arises from features of conse-
quentialism that seem to speak in the theory’s favor.
Compared to other objections to consequentialism, the compulsory self-benefit 
objection has garnered little attention. The purpose of this article is therefore to explore 
how consequentialists might best answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. While 
some might find “biting the bullet” sufficient—acknowledging the force of the objection 
but maintaining that the other merits of consequentialism outweigh that force—I shall 
6 See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 20–24, for 
a canonical expression of this principle of “equal consideration of interests.”
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assume that consequentialists would prefer to answer the objection on its face in a way 
that does minimal damage to their theory. The challenge, then, is to ascertain how con-
sequentialism might permit individuals not to benefit themselves without relinquishing 
the commitments that give consequentialism its theoretical appeal.
I cannot consider every strategy by which consequentialists might try to answer the 
compulsory self-benefit objection. Here I will canvass several strategies that either 
strike me as particularly promising or have not been previously explored.7 Ultimately, 
the strategies I consider here all founder on one or more of the following three worries: 
first, they do not account for a broad enough spectrum of the intuitively morally per-
missible instances of failures to self-benefit (for example, pure failures to self-benefit); 
second, they address the objection through ad hoc maneuvers that license failures to 
self-benefit without motivating these maneuvers by appeal to consequentialist princi-
ples or commitments; or third, they do not adequately explain how the permissibility of 
failing to benefit oneself is grounded in a moral option—that is, they do not provide 
compelling explanations of how both benefitting oneself and failing to do so are morally 
permissible. I do not take their failures to demonstrate the impossibility of a credible 
consequentialist response to the compulsory self-benefit objection. But their failures do 
suggest that the objection is more formidable than the extant literature implies, and defend-
ers of consequentialism would be wise to exert more effort in explicitly answering it.
Our discussion unfolds as follows. In the next section, I consider whether conse-
quentialist theories that evaluate actions in terms of their motives can answer the 
compulsory self-benefit objection. Section 2 turns to two ways of addressing the objec-
tion by deviating from standard maximizing forms of consequentialism. In sections 3 
and 4, I argue that the objection can be classified as an instance of more familiar objec-
tions to consequentialism—that it gives insufficient due to special relationships and is 
exceedingly demanding, respectively—but consequentialist responses to those more 
familiar objections do not readily apply to the compulsory self-benefit objection. 
Section 5 considers whether dual-ranking act consequentialism has the resources to 
answer this objection through its appeal to the distinction between an agent’s moral 
reasons and her all-things-considered reasons for action. In my concluding section, I 
propose that an adequate consequentialist response to the compulsory self-benefit 
object must account for options directed at the self, a notion difficult to reconcile with 
central consequentialist commitments.
1. Motive Consequentialism
As noted at the outset, altruism and beneficence are generally applauded, greed and self-
indulgence generally deplored. This might suggest that a consequentialist theory that 
7 I engage with some strategies not addressed here in my “Agents, Patients, and Compulsory 
Self-benefit,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (2014): 159–184.
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takes motives rather than acts as its focus could offer a satisfactory response to the 
 compulsory self-benefit objection.
Suppose that an individual S’s action A is obligatory only if S would perform A if S 
were to act on the basis of a set of desires D that, on balance and over time, leads S to 
maximize overall goodness through her actions. We might view this as the core of an 
“ideal motivation” consequentialist theory, wherein acts are judged indirectly, not in 
terms of whether they themselves maximize overall goodness but in terms of whether 
an agent whose motivations conduce to maximizing goodness would perform such acts.
A crucial question regarding this theory is, “what is D?” This version of consequen-
tialism would be ineffective against the compulsory self-benefit objection if D is the 
desire to maximize overall goodness. For an agent motivated by that desire would 
choose to maximize overall goodness, thus ruling out failures of self-benefit. However, 
some philosophers have argued that the motives the possession of which would maxi-
mize overall goodness would not include the motive to maximize overall goodness, 
much in the way that being motivated to maximize pleasure may actually undercut the 
aim of maximizing one’s pleasure.8 The question at hand, then, is whether the set of 
goodness-maximizing desires would include, or allow for, failures to self-benefit. On its 
face, we might expect that a goodness-maximizing set of desires would be primarily 
benevolent or other-focused: given our egoistic propensities, a set of desires that coun-
teracts those propensities by largely directing our attention and concern toward the 
interests of others would lead to high levels of goodness overall. A community of altru-
ists, we would anticipate, would be better off than a community of egoists. If so, then 
agents motivated by those desires that maximize overall goodness would only rarely 
benefit themselves when doing so is best overall. An ideal motive consequentialism 
might therefore give significant breadth to failures to benefit oneself.
This reasoning is too quick though. For one, in cases of pure self-benefit, no one else’s 
interests are at stake, and yet it seems permissible not to maximize benefits to oneself. 
An ideally motivated agent should be willing to benefit herself in such a case, in opposi-
tion to her generally benevolent motives. This reasoning also neglects how the pursuit 
of self-interest can sometimes redound to the benefit of others. One need not be a dyed-
in-the-wool Mandevillean to recognize that at least sometimes the ardent pursuit of 
one’s self-interest can also promote the interests of others. When we pursue our own 
good through cooperative endeavors with others or when we produce goods we 
exchange with others, we increase overall well-being despite being guided by selfish 
motives. Finally, there are dangers in excessive benevolence or concern for others. A 
theme within some feminist writings is that traditional patriarchal cultures can encour-
age women to prioritize the interests of others over women’s own interests, resulting in 
the reinforcement of oppressive practices and the diminution of women’s self-respect.9 
So while an ideally motivated consequentialist agent might be predominantly altruistic, 
her motivations can err too far in that direction, and there may be a significant number 
8 See Robert Merrihew Adams, “Motive Utilitarianism,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 467–481.
9 Diana T. Meyers, “The Politics of Self-Respect: A Feminist Perspective,” Hypatia 1 (1986): 83–100.
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of instances wherein purely altruistic motivation fails to be best from a consequentialist 
perspective because one’s own interests are neglected. Sorting out just how often an 
 ideally motivated consequentialist agent would attend to her self-interest is a complex 
empirical matter that I cannot hope to settle here. Still, any such consequentialist theory 
will face the problem of how to situate the interests of the self within a largely altruistic 
motivational economy without ignoring the interests of the self in ways that consequen-
tialism rejects.
2. Nonmaximization Strategies
Consequentialists may seek to address the self-benefit objection by adopting a non-
maximizing standard of obligatory action that allows for failures to self-benefit. For 
example, satisficing consequentialists may propose that so long as agents produce a suf-
ficient amount of good through their actions, they meet their obligations. And in cases 
of failures of self-benefit, agents may fail to maximize overall good while still producing 
enough good by consequentialist lights. In both Enrollment and Evacuation, perhaps 
Josephine and Igor do well enough even if they do not do what is impartially best.
Moving to a satisficing rather than maximizing standard has the advantage of explain-
ing how self-benefit is an option: an agent acts rightly if, by failing to benefit herself, she 
either does well enough or if she exceeds the satisficing standard. A satisficing standard 
thus permits, but does not require, maximization. The difficulty with this strategy is that 
the moral permission not to benefit oneself appears very wide, and there is no particular 
reason to expect that all instances in which an agent fails to benefit herself will meet the 
satisficing standard. Take Evacuation: suppose Igor foregoes a very large amount of 
good to himself by failing to evacuate. If doing so is permissible, then satisficing conse-
quentialism would, in order to vindicate this conclusion, have to depart significantly 
from a maximizing standard. But there is no apparent basis for adopting such a lenient 
satisficing standard aside from its ability to address failures to self-benefit. Why, after all, 
should we expect that a qualitative property actions may have (i.e., that they fail to ben-
efit oneself to the greatest degree) will coincide with a quantitative property of actions 
(i.e., that they produce enough good to meet the satisficing consequentialists’ demands) 
in every instance? We have better reason, I suggest, to expect that any intuitively plausi-
ble satisficing standard will at least sometimes disallow apparently permissible failures 
of self-benefit.
Moreover, such a wide departure from maximization would presumably apply not 
only in instances of failures of self-benefit but across the board, that is, to situations 
where an individual falls short of maximization solely with regard to how much good 
her actions produce for others. But absent some rationale for restricting these devia-
tions only to self-regarding deviations, a satisficing strategy for answering the com-
pulsory self-benefit objection runs the risk of asking too little of agents with respect to 
others’ good.
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Another way to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection by jettisoning strict 
maximization is to incorporate a distinction between benefits to an agent and benefits to 
others. Ted Sider, for example, has put forth a self/other asymmetrical consequentialist 
theory wherein if agent S performs act A, then A is obligatory if and only if (1) no other 
action produces more impartial overall good than A, and (2) no other action produces 
more good from the “selfless perspective” that excludes those goods that A provided 
to S.10 Sider furthermore proposes that if two alternative actions A and B are such that 
A satisfies condition (1) but not condition (2), while B satisfies condition (2) but not 
condition (1), then A and B represent a moral “tie,” in which case an individual can per-
missibly perform either A or B. Sider’s revised consequentialist standard would appear 
to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection insofar as it denies that self-benefit is 
morally obligatory. If we apply it to Enrollment, it would seem true that Josephine’s 
enrolling in the ethics course satisfies condition (1) but not condition (2), since there 
is  no action that results in more impartial good, but there is an action—facilitating 
Kelly’s enrollment—that produces more good when the goods that might accrue to 
Josephine are excluded. Her facilitating Kelly’s enrollment is permissible (though 
Josephine’s enrolling would be permissible as well).
In the case of Evacuation, however, Sider’s asymmetrical consequentialism stumbles. 
Igor’s evacuating rather than remaining in his apartment satisfies Sider’s condition (1), 
since his evacuating benefits him and thus (assuming that others’ interests are unaf-
fected by his decision) would be better with respect to overall personal good. But Igor’s 
remaining also satisfies Sider’s condition (2), because no other action besides Igor’s 
remaining (including his evacuating) produces more good from the “selfless perspec-
tive” that excludes whatever goods that Igor gains from remaining. His remaining rather 
than evacuating makes no difference from that perspective. Thus, remaining versus 
evacuating is not a tie, and Igor violates his moral obligations by remaining. Sider’s revi-
sion to consequentialism thus seems to yield intuitively plausible answers in cases of 
offsetting failures to self-benefit but not in cases of pure failures to self-benefit.
But even if Sider’s asymmetrical consequentialism succeeded in making sense of pure 
failures to self-benefit, it has the deeper theoretical defect of addressing the compulsory 
self-benefit objection in a largely ad hoc manner. As Sider himself recognizes, his 
revisions to standard consequentialism may lead to more plausible results about the “moral 
normative status of actions,” but these results are not grounded in any “independently 
important axiological facts.”11 And consequentialists themselves should have reser-
vations about modifying the consequentialist standard to address the compulsory 
self-benefit objection. Both satisficing consequentialism and Sider’s asymmetrical 
consequentialism tacitly reject maximization, and the latter rejects impartiality. To the 
extent then that maximization and impartiality are compelling features of the conse-
quentialist moral framework, these revisions to the consequentialist framework repre-
sent theoretical costs, and at least some consequentialists (I expect) will find these costs 
10 Ted Sider, “Asymmetry and Self-sacrifice,” Philosophical Studies 70 (1993): 117–132.
11 Sider, “Asymmetry and Self-sacrifice,” 128.
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not a reasonable concession to the theory’s critics but the repudiation of what makes 
consequentialism appealing in the first place.
3. Special Relationships
Consequentialists have proven very resourceful in answering the many objections to 
which their theory has been subject. Thus, if the compulsory self-benefit objection 
resembles an extant objection to which consequentialists have given compelling replies, 
then an adequate response to the objection may emerge. Let us now consider whether 
such a strategy may succeed in connection with the complaint that consequentialism 
places inadequate stock in special relationships.
This objection holds that because consequentialists generally insist on impartiality, 
their theory cannot make sense of instances where partiality is morally permissible, 
even laudable. Chief among these instances of laudable partiality is our tendency to 
accord the interests of those close to us—our romantic partners, children, friends, and 
family members—greater weight in our decision making than the interests of mere 
strangers.
The compulsory self-benefit objection can be analyzed as an idiosyncratic instance of 
the special relationships objection. If we are morally permitted not to benefit ourselves 
even when doing so would be required by the consequentialist demand to maximize 
overall goodness, then this permission can be viewed as reflecting a permissible “par-
tiality” toward ourselves. This partiality is different from the partiality licensed by other 
special relationships. For whereas those relationships seem to entitle us to accord cer-
tain individuals’ interests greater weight in our decision making, the special relationship 
to self seems to license us assigning lesser weight to our own interests in our decision 
making, that is, to allow us not to benefit ourselves. Our distinctive relationships toward 
particular others establishes special obligations; our distinctive relationship to ourselves 
establishes special options.
It is unlikely though that the arguments consequentialists have deployed in order to 
validate special relationships can be applied in the case of compulsory self-benefit and 
the special relationship to self.
One such argument is that attending to our special relationships, despite being a 
deviation from impartial consequentialist reasoning, in fact results in the best overall 
consequences. Realizing impartially best outcomes may sometimes be the result of par-
tiality, so that when we care for our friends to a greater degree than we care for strangers, 
we strengthen practices that, in general and for the most part, redound to everyone’s 
benefit. It may be, then, that consequentialism does not only permit the cultivation and 
recognition of special relationships. Rather, the consequentialist project of maximizing 
overall goodness will require their cultivation and recognition. But this argument 
extends uncomfortably to our special relationship to self: being “partial” by discounting 
our own well-being may result in greater overall well-being in nonoffsetting failures of 
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self-benefit such as Enrollment, yet it seems unlikely that it results in greater overall 
well-being in pure failures to self-benefit such as Evacuation. For recall that Igor’s 
remaining in his apartment harms him with no compensating gain to others.12
A second way consequentialists have addressed the special relationships objection is 
by claiming that such relationships are not means to valuable ends or outcomes, but are 
intrinsically valuable in their own right. The partiality shown in special relationships is 
necessary and morally justified because it is part and parcel of something good in itself. 
Here too it is difficult to see how this line of thought can be extended to the self and 
apparently permissible failures to benefit ourselves. Again, the failure to benefit our-
selves is an option; that is, it is also permissible for agents to choose to benefit themselves 
as well. To fail in one’s special obligations to one’s friends, say, is to undercut whatever 
value our friendships have. But in the case of the special relationship to ourselves, the 
relationship cannot be undercut by what we do (or fail to do) in the way of benefitting 
ourselves, and if something is good in itself regardless of whether our actions maintain it 
or not, it is hard to decipher how the putative good is a good in any recognizably conse-
quentialist sense. If an agent could equally maintain this good by benefitting herself and 
by failing to do so, then this good is not an outcome of what she does and so does not 
look like a good with which consequentialist morality is concerned.
4. Demandingness
Another familiar objection to consequentialism that resembles the compulsory self-
benefit objection is the complaint that consequentialism is too demanding.13
The usual gloss on this objection is that consequentialism requires us to forego more 
of our interests or well-being than it is reasonable or morally defensible to demand. The 
impartial maximization of overall good appears to entail that we are obligated to forego 
most luxuries in order to donate large sums of money to the poor; that we are obligated 
to forego the pleasures of meat eating in order to curtail harms to animals; or that we 
are obligated to choose our careers not on the basis of our aspirations or values but on 
the basis of which careers will do the most good. Such demands, the objection goes, are 
unreasonable. Either a more plausible consequentialist theory, making less extensive 
demands on individuals’ well-being, must be expounded or we should reject conse-
quentialism altogether.
12 I take such reasoning to also speak against “sophisticated” consequentialist attempts to answer the 
compulsory self-benefit objection. See my “Agents, Patients, and Compulsory Self-benefit,” for more 
discussion.
13 See, in a very large literature, Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: 
Clarendon/Oxford, 1984); Liam B. Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 22 (1993): 267–292; and Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).
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So described, the demandingness objection and the compulsory self-benefit objection 
may seem unrelated. After all, the latter is the complaint that consequentialism requires 
us to benefit ourselves, whereas the former is the complaint that consequentialism pre-
cludes us from benefitting ourselves in ways that seem morally defensible. However, the 
demandingness objection can be recast in terms of options, with the result that the com-
pulsory self-benefit objection is an instance of it: consequentialism is unreasonably 
demanding in depriving us of options,14 including the apparently permissible option of 
failing to benefit ourselves. So depicted, that consequentialism disallows failures to self-
benefit shows that it encumbers us not only in terms of our well-being but in terms of 
our exercising our capacities of choice. Independently from its constraining (perhaps 
unreasonably) our pursuit of our well-being, consequentialism is too “confining” with 
respect to the options it leaves us,15 including options regarding self-benefit.
Debates about the demandingness of consequentialism have generally concerned 
how to temper the demands of beneficence rather than the demands of self-interest. Yet 
if the compulsory self-benefit objection is an instance of the demandingness objection, 
then that provides a reason to suppose that consequentialist rejoinders to the demand-
ingness objection might also serve as effective rejoinder to the compulsory self-benefit 
objection. In particular, this strategy would be effective against the compulsory self-
benefit objection if consequentialist answers to the demandingness objection, despite 
having been developed to accommodate agents’ pursuit of their own interests, could be 
extrapolated to accommodate agents’ abnegation of their own interests. It is difficult to 
see how such an extrapolation could be achieved though.
One possibility is to argue that reductions in overall value due to failures to  self- benefit 
are mitigated by other goods involved in the exercise of choice. So in the case of 
Enrollment, even though Josephine’s helping Kelly enroll in the ethics course may be 
worse overall from the standpoint of well-being (since Kelly benefits less from the course 
than Josephine would), her doing so has value insofar as it is an exercise of liberty, 
autonomy, or the like. And if the value of Josephine’s choosing is equal to or greater 
than the value of the well-being she foregoes by helping Kelly enroll, then appearances 
notwithstanding, Josephine has satisfied the consequentialist standard of maximiza-
tion. For no other action ranks better in terms of overall good than her helping Kelly 
enroll in the ethics course.
This reasoning suffers from two defects, First, the value of choice will, in general, con-
tribute as much value as agents forego when they fail to benefit themselves is an unlikely 
thesis. Again, suppose in Evacuation that Igor foregoes a great deal of well-being by 
remaining in his apartment. There is no obvious reason to suppose that this amount of 
well-being is counterbalanced by some equal or greater quantity of well-being associ-
ated with his exercising her power to choose not to benefit himself. Second, recall that 
the permissibility of failing to benefit oneself rests on an option: It is permissible to 
14 David Sobel, “The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection,” Philosophers’ Imprint 7 (2007) 
www.philosophersimprint.org/007008/, 2.
15 Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 98.
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benefit oneself or to forego such benefits. This reasoning cannot make sense of such an 
option. For suppose in Enrollment that Josephine decides instead to enroll in the ethics 
course herself. In order for this to be a permissible option on a consequentialist view, it 
must (with respect to overall good) tie with her actual decision to help Kelly enroll in 
the course. But that appears impossible. For assuming that whatever contribution her 
choosing makes to the overall value of the ensuing state of affairs remains steady (i.e., 
that value is the same regardless of which option she chooses), then because her own 
enrollment promotes the greatest amount of well-being overall, then her enrolling must 
produce the greatest good overall. The only way to avoid this conclusion is to prove the 
unlikely claim that when Josephine helps Kelly enroll, the value of her so choosing 
exceeds the value associated with her choosing to enroll herself.
The other general route for addressing the demandingness objection is accommoda-
tionist—to establish an “agent-centered prerogative” that allows agents not to “devote 
energy and attention to their projects and commitments in strict proportion to the value 
from an impersonal standpoint of their doing so.”16 As developed by Samuel Scheffler, 
the agent-centered prerogative is intended to enable agents to permissibly pursue their 
central projects and commitments even when doing so would, from a strictly imper-
sonal point of view, not be maximally good.
The agent-centered prerogative thus seems to license morally permissible failures of 
self-benefit, since they too are deviations from what would be maximizing from an 
impersonal point of view.
Here again, that failures to self-benefit are exercises of moral options stymies conse-
quentialist efforts to answer the compulsory self-benefit objection. If the appeal to an 
agent-centered prerogative amounts to asserting that when agents fail to benefit them-
selves they do not maximize overall well-being but do realize other goods—the value of 
choice, autonomy, integrity, and so on—then this is simply a restatement of the strategy 
we just rejected. But if it is not an appeal to the value of choice, it is hard to see that the 
considerations that motivate an agent-centered prerogative allowing individuals to 
forego maximizing good in the service of their central projects and commitments 
support the moral permissibility of an option not to benefit oneself. For the intuitive 
basis of this option is not a moral permission not to maximize because of some compel-
ling reason that emerges from within individuals’ personal points of view. Consider 
Evacuation again: Igor presumably does not maximize goodness by remaining in his 
apartment. But the moral permissibility of his doing so is not faithfully captured by the 
thought he thereby permissibly fails to maximize overall well-being. Scheffler’s agent-
centered prerogative allows agents not to maximize impersonal goodness by taking into 
account agent-centered reasons rooted in their personal projects and commitments. 
The picture suggested here is that when such reasons are arrayed against impersonal 
reasons, they will at least sometimes (but not necessarily) be sufficiently compelling to 
establish a moral permission for agents not to maximize impersonal goodness. 
Examples such as Evacuation remind us that the moral permission not to benefit 
16 Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 9–10.
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ourselves is very wide, not an option to discount our well-being to some degree but an 
option to exempt our well-being, partially or in full, from the moral calculus as we see 
fit. Igor’s permission not to benefit himself does not flow from any judgment regarding 
whether he correctly balances impersonal reasons with agent-centered ones. It instead 
rests on a right to disregard his well-being for moral purposes, an entitlement to set aside 
his well-being so far as moral decision making goes. We prescind from moral criticism 
of choices like Igor’s from a recognition that his relationship to his good is his business. 
Agents thus enjoy a sort of authority with respect to their own well-being. This authority 
may be cashed out in terms of what Joseph Raz called “exclusionary reasons,” reasons “to 
refrain from acting for some reason.”17 When a commanding officer gives a soldier a 
binding order to X, the order serves as a reason that “excludes” whatever reasons the sol-
dier might otherwise have that bear on X, mooting those reasons in the soldier’s delib-
eration. In like manner, I suggest, the moral permissibility of not benefitting ourselves 
flows from an authoritative relation we have to our well-being, one that permits us to 
exclude our well-being from the domain of moral appraisal—to treat our own well-
being as irrelevant to moral choice. Note that the permissibility of failures to self-benefit 
is itself a moral permission; for it would be morally objectionable in most cases to com-
pel individuals to benefit themselves. But it is a permission not rooted in the quality or 
magnitude of a person’s reasons, impersonal or agent-centered, but in a basic moral 
power to exclude one’s own good from the practical determination of what is morally 
best or obligatory.18
Consequentialist responses to the demandingness objection are therefore unlikely to 
succeed in addressing the compulsory self-benefit objection: if they appeal to how fail-
ures to maximize (say) overall well-being can be counteracted by other goods, then it is 
unlikely that these other goods are just valuable enough to establish an option between 
benefitting ourselves and failing to do so. And effective ties between these options are 
unlikely given the apparently wide breadth of permissible failures to self-benefit. If con-
sequentialists attempt to extend the agent-centered prerogative to failure to self-benefit, 
this incorrectly grounds the permission not to benefit ourselves in the balance of rea-
sons among impersonal and agent-relative reasons. The evidently wide permissibility of 
not benefitting ourselves, I propose, appears to instead be rooted in a moral power to 
exclude our own well-being from moral deliberation and choice.
5. Dual-Ranking Consequentialism
A final theoretical option for addressing the compulsory self-benefit objection is dual-
ranking act consequentialism. The theory and its philosophical motivations are too 
17 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 39.
18 For an elaboration of moral agency in terms of practical powers, see Michael Cholbi, “Paternalism 
and Our Rational Powers,” Mind 126 (2017):123–153.
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complex to investigate in depth here. But the gist of the theory (as articulated by 
Douglas Portmore19) is as follows: Because they morally evaluate actions in terms of 
their outcomes, all consequentialist theories are necessarily committed to ranking out-
comes in terms of their being better or worse. Orthodox versions of consequentialism 
rank outcomes in terms of value or goodness from an evaluator-neutral point of view. 
Portmore’s dual-ranking theory diverges from these versions of consequentialism in 
two ways. First, outcomes are ranked not in terms of the goodness or value resulting 
from an action but in terms of the desirability of outcomes. Second, outcomes are 
ranked both in terms of moral reasons (i.e., reasons rooted in what outcomes would be 
better for others20) and nonmoral reasons, with the latter including what are standardly 
thought of as agent-relative reasons, such as a person’s reason to want to not cause harm 
to others (understood as distinct from the agent-neutral reason not to want harms to 
occur). By incorporating these nonmoral, personal reasons, dual-ranking theory pro-
vides a ranking that is relative to particular evaluators or agents. Moral permissibility, on 
Portmore’s picture, does not turn solely on moral reasons. For given the truth of moral 
rationalism—that agents can only be morally required to do what they have decisive 
reasons to do, all things considered—it may be the case that agents have sufficient rea-
son not to do what moral reasons alone mandate. Moral permissibility thus turns on 
both moral reasons and an agent’s all-things-considered reasons, so that an act is mor-
ally permissible for a given agent “if and only if, and because, there is no available act 
alternative that would produce an outcome that [the agent] has both more moral reason 
and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain.”21 Dual-ranking act conse-
quentialism appears capable of answering the compulsory self-benefit objection because 
it provides agents morally permissible options when outcomes diverge with respect to 
moral versus all-things-considered reasons. The option not to benefit oneself arises 
when an agent has a nonmoral reason to benefit herself22 such that this reason, in con-
cert with her other reasons, entails that she has most reason all-things-considered to 
benefit herself but most moral reason not to benefit herself. Thus, in examples such as 
Enrollment, we may view Josephine as (a) having more moral reason to enable Kelly’s 
enrollment, since that results in the better outcome for others, but (b) most reason 
all-things-considered to enroll herself. By making logical space for agents to act on 
options that do not maximize goodness from an all-things-considered perspective, 
dual-ranking consequentialism looks especially promising in addressing the compul-
sory self-benefit objection. That said, this strategy faces difficulties on two fronts.
First, dual-ranking act consequentialism analyzes options in terms of divergences 
between moral and nonmoral (or between moral and all-things-considered) agents’ 
reasons. But we may wonder whether all instances of failure to self-benefit can be ana-
lyzed in this way. In Enrollment, Josephine may well face a situation in which her moral 
19 Douglas Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011).
20 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 94.
21 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 118.
22 Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism, 40.
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reasons point one way and her nonmoral reasons another way. Perhaps, then, dual-ranking 
act consequentialism fares well in accounting for cases of nonoffsetting failures of 
self-benefit. But it appears shakier with respect to cases of pure failures of self-benefit, 
such as Igor in Evacuation. Again, we may be curious as to what Igor’s reasons for not 
evacuating and so causing himself harm are. But his remaining being permissible does 
not seem to be a matter of his having more reason all-things-considered to remain in his 
apartment, reasons in comparison to which his moral reasons are comparatively mod-
est. Only his good is at stake. It looks as if his moral and nonmoral reasons align here 
such that the permissibility of his not benefitting himself cannot be traced to any facts 
about how weighty those reasons are in relation to one another.
More generally, dual-ranking act consequentialism, even when it logically implies 
permissible failures of self-benefit, may not provide the most parsimonious explanation 
of the option not to benefit oneself. Portmore dubs his dual-ranking consequentialism 
“common sense” inasmuch as it recognizes that moral reasons are not rationally deci-
sive. But I doubt that “common-sense” reactions to cases of failure to self-benefit would 
judge them permissible because in such instances, an agent has no other act alternative 
available to her that “would produce an outcome that [the agent] has both more moral 
reason and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain.” As we noted in the 
previous section, Igor’s failure to benefit himself is immune to moral criticism, most 
would say, because his not benefitting himself is his right, an option to which he is 
entitled because he is deciding about his own good instead of the good of others. 
Other moral agents do not so much judge his act as morally permissible in light of his 
reasons as they do prescind from judging his reasons at all. For like other competent 
moral agents, Igor’s relationship to his good (and Josephine’s to hers) is largely his busi-
ness, and while he may sometimes be entitled to prioritize his good, he is no less entitled 
to deprioritize his good without reference to the first-order reasons that motivate his 
deprioritizing it.
Dual-ranking act consequentialism errs, I suggest, in trying to account for options 
such as the permissibility not to benefit oneself by reference to agents’ first-order rea-
sons for action. It is probably correct to deny that moral reasons necessarily give agents 
decisive reasons for action and so exhaust the factors that determine acts’ deontic status. 
But the permissibility of not acting on what there is most moral reason to do, including 
failing to benefit oneself, is explained more directly, simply, and elegantly in terms of our 
having a moral power or authority over ourselves rather than in terms of conflicts 
between two categories of reasons and the relative magnitudes of the reasons within 
those categories.23
In fairness, dual-ranking act consequentialism could incorporate the power to 
exclude one’s own good from moral consideration by thinking of this as a second-order 
reason. Some of our reasons, after all, are reasons rooted in such powers (some moral 
philosophers would classify these as “reasons of autonomy,” etc.). But introducing 
23 See my “Agents, Patients, and Compulsory Self-benefit,” section VII, for further details about the 
powers in question.
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second-order reasons threatens to complicate an already complex account of moral 
 permissibility. For the theory must then explain how first-order moral reasons, first-
order nonmoral reasons, and second-order moral reasons (which in turn shape the role 
first-order reasons play in determinations both of an agent’s all-things-considered rea-
sons and of moral permissibility) relate in such manner as to yield options when moral 
reasons and all-things-considered reasons diverge. It would be premature to claim that 
such relations cannot be plausibly elucidated, but some a priori skepticism about that 
project seems warranted.
6. Conclusion: Self, Other,  
and Directed Options
Our discussion has canvassed some, but not all, of the possible consequentialist 
responses to the compulsory self-benefit objection that attempt to establish the permis-
sibility of not benefitting ourselves. While these responses vary in their shortcomings, 
their struggles in addressing this objection help illuminate why the objection is troubling 
for consequentialism.
At its heart, consequentialism stands opposed to actions having fundamentally 
directed deontic status.24 As debates about special obligations indicate, in claiming that 
our duties rest on bringing about particular outcomes, consequentialism struggles to 
account for how the performance of our duties can be owed to specific individuals or 
how failures of duty wrong them. After all, having a duty to a person is crucially different 
from having a duty to realize some state of affairs. The compulsory self-benefit objection 
shows that consequentialists similarly struggle to make sense of directed options: the 
permission not to benefit oneself is an option but not one that an agent has with 
respect to anyone beside herself; that is, she is not at liberty to assign others’ good lesser 
significance in her moral deliberation. A consequentialist response to the compulsory 
self-benefit objection would therefore need to invoke some sort of asymmetry between 
oneself and others to make sense of it as an option.
Moreover, as sections 4 and 5 illustrate, the wide breadth of the moral permissibility 
of not benefitting ourselves implies that consequentialist approaches that try to answer 
this objection by appealing to the strength of personal (or nonmoral) reasons mis-
represent the nature of this permissibility. It rests not on some category of (first-order) 
reasons whose significance permits us not to benefit ourselves but on a seemingly more 
basic moral power or right to exclude, to whatever degree an individual sees fit, her good 
from the deliberative weighing of reasons.
24 See Marcus Hedahl, The Significance of a Duty’s Direction,” Journal of Ethics and Social 
Philosophy 7, no. 3: 1–29, for discussion of deontic directedness.
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In sum, then, the compulsory self-benefit objection resists an easy consequentialist 
answer because it requires much more than simply making sense of nonmaximizing 
options. In resting on a directed option, it exerts pressure on consequentialists’ commit-
ment to impersonality, and in having a wide breadth, it exerts pressure on the funda-
mental consequentialist assumption that all and only outcomes of actions contribute to 
their deontic status.
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